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How	do	patronage	networks	affect	military	cohesion?
Judith	Verweijen	examines	the	impact	of	patronage	networks	on	military	cohesion	within	the	Armed	Forces	of	the
Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	(FARDC).
This	article	is	part	of	the	#PublicAuthority	blog	series,	part	of	the	ESRC-funded	Centre	for	Public	Authority
and	International	Development.	
Military	cohesion	is	increasingly	recognised	as	crucial	for	shaping	the	behaviour	of	state	and	insurgent	forces.
Cohesion	primarily	refers	to	bonding	between	combatants	as	well	as	between	subordinates	and	commanders.	It
relates	to	relations	both	in	small-scale	fighting	units	(eg	squad)	and	secondary	combat	groups	(eg	battalion).	But
cohesion	is	sometimes	also	used	to	describe	military	personnel’s	feelings	of	connectedness	with	the	military
organisation	at	large	and	the	relative	integration	of	its	various	components.
Why	is	cohesion	important?	Bonding	between	military	personnel	deeply	influences	combat	performance	and	norm
enforcement.	As	such,	it	is	an	important	explanatory	factor	in	violence	against	civilians.	By	establishing	mutual	trust
and	loyalty,	cohesion	facilitates	respect	for	group	norms.	Whether	this	translates	into	good	or	bad	behaviour	towards
civilians,	however,	depends	on	the	content	of	those	norms.	Thus,	cohesion	is	a	double-edged	sword.
Most	theories	on	military	cohesion	were	developed	in	relation	to	Western	government	forces.	To	what	extent	are
these	theories	then	applicable	to	armies	in	different	contexts	with	different	characteristics?	I	tried	to	answer	this
question	for	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	(FARDC),	among	which	I	conducted	long-
term	ethnographic	field	research.	As	I	explain	in	recently	published	work,	while	many	assumptions	on	cohesion	apply
to	the	FARDC,	they	do	not	account	for	one	factor	that	is	particularly	important:	patronage	networks.
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Within	the	FARDC,	formal	command	chains	intersect	and	overlap	with	ties	of	personal	loyalty	between	patrons	and
clients.	Yet	personnel	within	one	and	the	same	unit	are	generally	part	of	different	patronage	networks,	and	some
patrons	are	more	powerful	than	others.	As	a	result,	their	clients	are	better	off	than	colleagues	in	the	same	unit.	An
important	reason	for	this	is	that	within	the	FARDC,	many	dimensions	of	service–like	assigned	positions,	access	to
transport	and	leave,	the	distribution	of	rewards	and	punishment–	are	subject	to	negotiations.	Formal	rules	and
regulations	exist,	but	are	often	not	applied.	As	one	army	officer	said:	“I	would	no	longer	call	this	an	army,	everything
is	negotiable.”
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Obviously,	the	outcome	of	negotiations	is	influenced	by	power	relations;	and	the	more	influential	one’s	patron,	the
better	one’s	negotiating	position.	The	result	is	substantial	inequalities	in	status	and	wealth.	Even	more	pronounced
differences	exist	between	commanders	and	subordinates.	Most	FARDC	soldiers	contacted	complained	about	their
commanders,	describing	how	they	were	merely	filling	their	own	pockets	without	caring	for	the	wellbeing	of	their
troops.	As	a	lieutenant	said:	“The	wife	of	the	deputy	commander	lives	next	to	the	wife	of	the	colonel,	because	she
has	nothing	to	eat.	And	when	he,	who	has	a	big	house,	gives	orders,	do	you	think	that	he	who	has	nothing	is	going	to
obey?	(	.	.	.	)	The	distances	between	the	high-ranking	and	the	low-ranking	are	simply	too	big”.
Complaints	about	superiors	were	even	more	pronounced	when	the	latter	were	connected	to	patronage	networks	with
a	salient	identity-dimension,	in	particular	identities	seen	as	“suspect”.	This	often	concerned	ex-rebels	integrated	into
the	army	and/or	Rwandophones	(speakers	of	Kinyarwanda	language).	In	such	cases,	military	personnel	did	not
ascribe	differences	in	treatment	and	status	to	patronage	politics,	but	saw	them	primarily	through	the	lens	of	identity.
In	this	manner,	conflict	narratives	that	are	found	in	Congolese	society	as	a	whole,	like	divisions	between
“Rwandophones”	and	self-styled	“autochthon”	groups,	are	reproduced	within	the	army.
These	divisions	may	undermine	the	effects	of	processes	that	are	theorised	to	foster	cohesion,	such	as	jointly
committing	abuses	against	civilians.	Where	soldiers	distrust	each	other	and	are	part	of	different	patronage	networks,
jointly	engaging	in	abuses	may	lead	to	increased	frictions,	for	instance	over	the	division	of	booty,	rather	than
increased	bonding.	As	my	research	shows,	disputes	may	also	emerge	around	punishment:	soldiers	with	important
patrons	are	often	exonerated	in	the	wake	of	abuses,	with	the	blame	uniquely	attributed	to	those	with	lesser
connections.	Obviously,	such	unequal	treatment	undermines	cohesion.	A	soldier	put	it	as	follows:	“you	have	those
here	who	are	untouchables….they	behave	badly	but	they	are	never	punished.	But,	we,	if	we	do	something	wrong,	we
go	directly	to	jail.”
While	there	is	thus	strong	evidence	that	patronage	networks	influence	military	cohesion,	we	should	be	careful	in
generalising	how	this	occurs.	Cohesion	is	shaped	by	many	different	interacting	factors.	As	a	result,	the	effects	of
patronage	networks	on	cohesion	formation	may	very	well	differ	from	one	army	to	the	next.	They	may	for	instance	be
much	more	pronounced	when	intersecting	with	rebel-military	integration	or	significant	military-economic	activity–
characteristics	not	found	in	every	army.		Therefore,	the	effects	of	patronage	networks	on	military	cohesion	can	never
be	merely	assumed,	but	must	always	be	carefully	empirically	studied.
Read	more	about	#PublicAuthority	and	visit	our	website.
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